Saint Louis University School of Law

Scholarship Commons
All Faculty Scholarship
2018

A Critical Examination of a Third Employment Category for OnDemand Work (In Comparative Perspective)
Miriam A. Cherry
Antonio Aloisi

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF A THIRD
EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY FOR ON-DEMAND WORK
(IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE)
Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi*
Forthcoming, Cambridge Handbook on the Law of the Sharing Economy
(Nestor M. Davidson, Michele Finck & John J. Infranca, Eds.)

A number of lawsuits in the United States are challenging the
employment classification of workers in the platform economy. Employee
status is a crucial gateway in determining entitlement to labor and
employment law protections. In response to this uncertainty, some
commentators have proposed an “intermediate”, “third,” or “hybrid”
category, situated between the categories of “employee” and
“independent contractor.”
After investigating the status of platform workers in the United
States, the authors provide snapshot summaries of five legal systems that
have experimented with implementing a legal tool similar to an
intermediate category to cover non-standard workers: Canada, Italy,
Spain, Germany, and South Korea. These various legal systems have had
diverse results. There has been success in some instances, and
unintended consequences in others.
Accordingly, we recommend proceeding with caution in considering
the creation of a third category. That is due to the risk of arbitrage
between the categories, and the possibility that some workers will lose
rights by having their status downgraded into the third category. Cherry
and Aloisi posit employee status as the default rule for most gig workers.
The authors propose an exception for those working on a de minimis
basis or those engaged in volunteerism for altruistic reasons.
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Introduction
During the past five years there have been a number of lawsuits
in the United States challenging the employment classification of
workers in the gig economy.1 Classification of a worker as an
employee is an important “gateway” to determine who receives the
protections of the labor and employment laws, including the right
to organize, minimum wage, and unemployment compensation, as
well as other obligations such as tax treatment. In response to both
litigation and widespread confusion about how gig workers should
be classified, some commentators have proposed a “third” or
“hybrid” category, situated between the categories of “employee”
and “independent contractor.” Proponents often note that creating
a third category would be a novel innovation, appropriately crafted
and tailored for an era of digital platform work.2
However, as we have noted in a previous article, such an
intermediate category of worker is actually not new. In this
chapter we will provide snapshot summaries of five legal systems
that have experimented with implementing a legal tool similar to a
third category to cover non-standard workers: Canada, Italy,
Spain, Germany, and South Korea. These various legal systems
have had diverse results. There has been success in some
instances, and misadventure in others. We believe that examining
these experiences closely will help to avoid potential problems that
are beginning to surface in discussions about the third category and
the gig economy.
This chapter largely will forgo the background on how
platforms operate or the description of the tasks workers do,
instead focusing on the classification problem3. After examining
the status of gig work in the United States and the calls for a third
category, we turn to look at summaries of five legal systems and
their experiences with the third category. After examining how, in
Italy, some employees actually lost rights because their status was
downgraded into an intermediate “parasubordinate” category, we
1

For a listing of the ongoing litigation surrounding the on-demand economy, see
Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of
Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 584-85 (2016).
2
See, e.g. Vin Guerrieri, Uber Cases Could Spur New Employee Classification,
LAW360 BLOG, May 6, 2016.
3
This topic is widely covered in the first section of this Handbook. See also
Antonio Aloisi, Commoditized workers: Case study research on labor law
issues arising from a set of on-demand/gig economy platforms, 37 COMP. LAB.
L. & POL’Y J. 577, 653-90 (2016).
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must be careful to consider the unintended consequences of
creating a third category. Informed by these national case studies,
we provide a review of what we might expect if a third category
were to be created in the United States, along with noting some of
the practical difficulties.
Based on the proposals for a third category as well as the
country studies, we ultimately set forward a different proposal for
reform. Rather than creating another category and risking further
mischief around the subject of worker misclassification, we
advocate that the default rule for platform work should be
employee status or something resembling it closely. At the same
time, we readily acknowledge that there are parts of the sharing
economy that are not about labor relations or potential exploitation
of workers; rather, they are about communities, innovation, and
genuine sharing. The goal of our proposal is protection for those
who are using platforms as their main source of income as an
equivalent to professional employment, while exempting those
who are using these platforms to create community values or as a
way to volunteer.
The Classification Problem in the United States
We will begin with the U.S., the jurisdiction that saw the
invention of the gig economy and that has, until recently, also been
the site of most classification disputes. Under U.S. law, whether a
worker is an employee or independent contractor is determined
through various multifactored tests dependent on the facts of the
relationship.4 The “control” test derives from the caselaw and
decisions on agency law, and focuses on a principal’s right to
control the worker. In brief we will suffice to say that some of the
factors for finding employee status are whether the employer may
direct the way in which the work is performed, determine the hours
involved, and provide the employee with direction.5 On the other
hand, elements that lean toward independent contractor
4

See Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees:
Employment Law for Workers without Workplaces and and Employees without
Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 257-58 (2006) (listing factors
from the cases). Oft-cited cases on this subject include Rutherford Food Corp.
v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728-29 (1947); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. U.S.,
398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,
326 (1992).
5
See, e.g. Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Service, Inc., 161 F.3d
299 (5th Cir. 1998).
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classification include high-skilled work, workers providing their
own equipment, workers setting their own schedules, and getting
paid per project, not per hour.6 In an alternate test, courts examine
the economic realities of the relationship to determine whether the
worker is exhibiting entrepreneurial activity, or whether the worker
is financially dependent upon the employer7. The label affixed to
the relationship is a factor in the outcome, but it is certainly not
dispositive.
Many commentators had hoped these disputes over worker
classification would be concluded, or at least be shaped, by the
wage and hour lawsuits within platform companies that have been
pending in the Northern District of California. But the largest of
these suits, O’Connor v. Uber, 8 has been in the process of settling
for over a year now. Like other litigation, including the
crowdwork minimum wage lawsuit Otey v. Crowdflower, the cases
have been settling without providing any definite answers about
whether platform workers are employees or independent
contractors.9
Calls for Creating a Third Category in the United States
As litigation over worker misclassification lawsuits
continues in various U.S. jurisdictions, proponents have looked to
the third category as a solution. Intuitively appealing, a third
category would resolve many of the ongoing lawsuits and disputes
over misclassification plaguing the on-demand sector. Many of the
calls for a third category originated in Silicon Valley, with the third
category virtually mirroring what is now independent contractor
status.10 Some proponents of the third category claim that such a
proposal would have advantages for gig workers as well, who
6

See, e.g. Richard R. Carlson, Variations on A Theme of Employment: Labor
Law Regulation of Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 663
(1996).
7
See Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees:
Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without
Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. L. & LAB. L. 251, 257–58 (2006).
8
O’Connor v. Uber, 3:13-cv-03826-EMC (N.D. Cal.).
9
Cherry, supra note 1 at 584-85.
10 “At a recent on-demand economy event, Simon Rothman, a venture
capitalist and advisor to companies like Lyft and Taskrabbit, said, “I think it’s
not 1099 versus W-2. I think the right answer is a third class of worker.”
Caroline Donovan, What a New Class of Worker Could Mean for the Future of
Labor,
BUZZFEED
NEWS,
June
18,
2015,
available
at
https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/meet-the-new-worker-same-asthe-old-worker?utm_term=.uipR68pav#.qe99zxMmQ.
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would at least attain some portion of the benefits that accrue to
employees.
In 2015 a report written by Alan Krueger and Seth Harris,
sponsored by the Hamilton Project, a subsidiary of the Brookings
Institute, advocated for the creation of a third category.11 Pursuant
to this proposal, all gig economy workers would default into
“independent worker” status.
Under the Hamilton project
proposal, such “independent workers” would gain rights to
organize and bargain collectively under the NLRA and would also
gain anti-discrimination protections under Title VII. However, the
Hamilton project proposal excludes payment for overtime and
minimum wage arrangements. Another study has come out largely
echoing the Hamilton Project proposal.12 Meanwhile, on the
political front, Senator Mark Warren of Virginia has recently
begun discussing the need for legislation to address some of the
issues surrounding gig-work.13
A Comparative Approach
To date, the recent calls to establish a third category of
“independent worker” have focused only on the present state of the
gig economy. Likewise, these calls have been centered almost
wholly on the United States, where many popular crowdwork
services were created. Situating the “dependent contractor”
category within an historical and global context, however, we note
that other countries have already experimented with contractual
forms that functionally resemble the intermediate category, with
various and mixed results. We provide “snapshots” of these legal
interventions below.
Canada

11 Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws
for Twenty-First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker,” THE HAMILTON
PROJECT, available at
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twent
y_first_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf.
12
Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, 43
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 31 (2017).
13
Mark Warner, Asking Tough Questions About the Gig Economy, MARK R.
WARNER
(June
19,
2015),
http://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/newsclips?ContentRecord_id=9
ec95aab-a96c-4dd5-8532-b45667013d2e.
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Historically, Canadian law used the term “employee” as a
gateway to coverage, using the binary employee / independent
contractor distinction just as in the United States. As most
statutory definitions of “employee” in Canadian statutes were
circular and unhelpful, the starting point for most analyses was the
control test that had evolved under the principle of vicarious
liability for torts.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the doctrine around
employee status took an interesting turn with the Canadian
adoption of the concept of “dependent contractor.” The
development of the category is largely due to the efforts of leading
law professor, Harry Arthurs.14 An article by Professor Arthurs’
noted that in the 1960s small tradespeople, artisans, plumbers,
craftsmen, and the like were increasingly structuring themselves as
separate business entities.15 Yet, despite setting up shop as
separate companies, and thus falling outside the traditional
purview of “employees,” these tradespeople had no other
employees but the one worker-owner. As a matter of economic
reality, Arthurs noted that these putative independent businesses
were often almost wholly economically dependent on larger
businesses. As such, Arthurs argued that the law did these small
business people an injustice in ruling them outside of the bounds of
the traditional labor relationship.16
The influence of Arthurs’ article spread far beyond
academic circles. As the court in Fownes Construction v.
Teamsters noted, this was “one law review article which has had
an impact on the real world.”17 Arthurs’ influence was such that
the concept of “dependent contractor” became established within
Canadian Law during the 1970s.18 The effect was significant and
beneficial in terms of bringing more workers within the scope of
14

Harry W. Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor: A Case Study of the Legal
Problems of Countervailing Power, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 89 (1965).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Fownes Construction Co. Ltd. and Teamsters, [1974] 1 CLRBR 452 (British
Columbia Labour Relations Board).
18
See Michael Bendel, The Dependent Contractor: An Unnecessary and Flawed
Development in Canadian Labour Law, 22 U. TORONTO L.J. 374, 376 (1982)
(“Although the notion of the dependent contractor did not surface in Canada
until 1965, concern for his status had become part of the conventional wisdom
on labour relations by the early 1970s. Between 1972 and 1977 seven
jurisdictions in Canada adopted legislation to grant dependent contractors
employee status under their labor relations legislation.”).
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collective bargaining.
Ultimately, in Canada the third category of “dependent
contractor” has resulted in an expansion of the definition of
employee. The category was enacted to help those workers who
were essentially working on their own in a position of economic
dependency, thus requiring labor protections.
The labor issues around platform work have yet to be heard
by a Canadian court or adjudicative body. As such, predictions are
inherently uncertain. But it does seem that the “dependent
contractor” category and accordingly expansive definition of
“employee” will make it more likely that gig economy workers
will be able to access labor protections.
Italy
Italy’s worker classification originated in the ancient Roman
Law notion of “locatio operarum” (right to control the worker)
and “locatio operis” (contract for a specific result).19 This
dichotomy was translated into the two categories of employee (in
Italian, “subordinate worker”) and independent contractor in the
Civil Code of 1942, with those binary categories still in force
today.
In addition to the “eterodirezione” or managerial power
factor,20 the case law has developed a spectrum of subsidiary
factors that could indicate the presence of an employment
relationship.21 A judge may disregard the contractual label when
19

The Roman distinction was between locatio conductio operarum, which refers
to the classic master and servant contract and implies the right to control and
encompasses respondeat superior, and locatio conductio conductio operis, which
was based on the production of a specific result. See generally WILLIAM
BURDIK, PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATIONS TO MODERN LAW
(1938); Matthew Finkin, Introduction, COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 1 (19992000).
20
Cass. 22 November 1999 no 12926, RIDL 200011633. Moreover, in order to
prove a subordinate relationship, this power should imply specific and welldefined directives rather than programmatic and vague instructions, since the
latters are also compatible with the independent contractor’s category. Their
compatibility with autonomous work are not sufficient for establishing an
employment relationship
21
Cass. sez. lav., 27/03/2000, n. 3674. “When an assessment of unambiguous
elements such as the exercise of the managerial and disciplinary power is not
enough to distinguish among employee and self-employed (being the presence
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the substance of the work relationship reveals legal indicia of
subordination (the so-called “primacy of facts” principle).22 These
factors include: (i) the requirement that the worker follow
reasonable work rules; (ii) the length of relationship; (iii) the
respect of set working hours; (iv) salaried work; and (v) absence of
risk of loss related to the production. None of these elements is
dispositive.23
Italian Law 533/1973 extended some procedural protection
to a tranche of self-employed workers, which would later come to
be known as “lavoratori parasubordinati” or “quasi-subordinate”
workers. Comprised of a sub-set of self-employed workers, these
lavoratori parasubordinati were distinguished as those workers
who were “collaborating with a principal/buyer under a
continuous, coordinated and predominantly personal relationship,
although not of subordinate character” (“co.co.co” by
abbreviation). Four “concurrent” factors needed to be ascertained
in order to denote this intermediate category: (i) cooperation; (ii)
continuity and length of the relationship; (iii) functional
coordination with the principal; (iv) a predominantly personal
service. This measure artificially created an intermediate category.
Looking at the content of the lavoratore parasubordinato
category, only limited rights, mostly consisting of access to the
labor courts, were extended to these workers. As a subset of
autonomous workers, quasi-subordinate workers were still outside
the scope of the substantive labor law.24 As a consequence, it was
much cheaper to hire a quasi-subordinate worker than an
employee, because employees are entitled to substantive labor
of the two powers a safe index of subordination, while its absence is not an
indisputable sign of autonomy)...”
22
Art. 1362 of the Italian Civil Code, provides that a contract must be
interpreted with regard to the common intention and the behavior of the parties,
and not merely to the literal meaning of its wording.
23
Maurizio Del Conte, Lavoro autonomo e lavoro subordinato: la volontà e gli
indici di denotazione, Orientamenti Della Giurisprudenza del Lavoro 66 (1995).
24
STEFANO LIEBMAN, ILO NAT’L STUDIES, EMPLOYMENT SITUATIONS AND
WORKERS’
PROTECTION, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--ed_dialogue/---dialogue/documents/genericdocument/wcms_205366.pdf; MARK
FREEDLAND & NICOLA KOUNTOURIS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF PERSONAL
WORK RELATIONS 122 n.61 (2011) (“The emergence of the notion of
parasubordinati in the Italian legal domain is traditionally linked to Law
533/1973, . . . which prescribed that the rules of procedure for labor litigation
also apply to the ‘relationship of agency, of commercial representation and other
relations of collaboration materialising in a continuous and coordinated
provision, predominantly personal, even if not of subordinate character.’”).
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rights, annual leave, sick leave, maternity leave, other employee
benefits, overtime, and job security against unfair dismissal.
Undesirable effects occurred quickly followed. Businesses
increasingly began to hire workers that would previously have
been classified as employees under the lavoratore parasubordinato
category, hiding bona fide employment relationships in order to
reduce costs and evade worker protections. Therefore, workers
saw a “gradual erosion of the protections afforded to employees
through jobs that are traditionally deemed to constitute masterservant relationships in the strict sense[,] progressively entering the
no man’s land of an inadequately defined notion.”25 Quasisubordinate workers were seen as a low-cost alternative to stable
employment relationships, especially because “no social security
contributions had to be paid in their regard by the principal, at that
time.”26
Revision truly began in 2003, when the legislature
amended the content of the quasi-subordinate category with
Legislative Decree No. 276/2003 (the so-called Biagi Reform).
The legislature required the collaboration be linked to at least one
“project” to ensure their authenticity and protect against businesses
disguising employees as quasi-subordinate. Thus, a new definition
emerged for quasi-subordinate workers: “lavoro a progetto” (i.e.
project work, also “co.co.pro”). In 2012, the Italian legislature
passed Law No. 92/2012 (Monti-Fornero Reform)27 to counteract
the misuse of the intermediate category by making employee status
the default. Ultimately, the 2015 “Jobs Act” fundamentally
eliminated the concept of project work that had its genesis in the
2003 Biagi law. The Jobs Act firmly established employee status
is the default. While the quasi-subordinate category still
technically exists, it is now limited in scope.28
25

STEFANO LIEBMAN, ILO NAT’L STUDIES, EMPLOYMENT SITUATIONS AND
WORKERS’
PROTECTION,
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--ed_dialogue/--- dialogue/documents/genericdocument/wcms_205366.pdf.
26
ULRIKE MUEHLBERGER, DEPENDENT SELF-EMPLOYMENT, WORKERS ON THE
BORDER BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT (2007).
27
Legge 28 giugno 2012, n. 92 - Disposizioni in materia di riforma del mercato
del lavoro in una prospettiva di crescita.
28
Article 2 of Legislative Decree No. 81/2015 (the “Jobs Act”) has designed a
new notion of “collaborations organised by the principal”, whereby the client
organises all performance related aspects, including above all time and site.
Should this be the case, all employment statutory provisions afforded to
subordinate workers apply to self-employed workers. See Antonio Aloisi, Il
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For the past two decades, the quasi-subordinate category in
Italy has resulted in arbitrage, struggle, and ultimately reversal.
Introducing such a non-standard contract initially resulted in some
employees seeing their classification status downgraded. Along
with this loophole came an increase in precarious and non-standard
work.
Spain
The Spanish Workers’ Act was passed in 1980, roughly ten
years after Italy had engaged in major legislative reform. This law,
Estatuto de los Trabajadores, covers only employees, defined as
“those individuals who voluntarily perform their duties, in
exchange for compensation, within the limits of the organisation
and under the directions of a natural or juridical person, referred to
as employer or entrepreneur.”29 Spanish independent contractors
were left to constitutional, civil and commercial provisions of the
law.30
The traditional binary classification between employees and
independent contractors in Spain depended upon a determination
of self-organization, as an exercise of contractual autonomy.
Spanish case law has interpreted the definition of an employee to
be a combination of two concurrent elements: (i) the exercise of
managerial power (“dirección”), and (ii) how much autonomy the
workers have.31 Spanish legal scholars have focused on the
element of “alienness” (“ajenidad”, also defined as “ownership by
another”) as a factor in determining whether an individual is an
employee. “Alienness” is a proxy for the allocation of risk, and
consequently, the ownership of “the means of production and the
financial benefits obtained by the company from the employee’s
lavoro “a chiamata” e le piattaforme online della “Collaborative Economy”:
nozioni e tipi legali in cerca di tutele/On-Demand Work and Online Platforms in
the Collaborative Economy, 2 LLI 2421 (2016).
29
Article 1.1 Ley, 8/1980, de 10 de marzo 1980. “Those persons who carry out a
trade or profession for economic gain on a regular, personal and direct basis on
their own account, in the absence of any supervision or direction from a third
party, whether or not they employ other workers on another’s account.” Ley,
8/1980, de 10 de marzo.
30
A relatively recent one, Constitucion Espanola 27 diciembre 1978.
31
Perulli, supra note 84; J. Lujan Alcaraz, Introducion, El Estatuto del Trabajo
Autónomo. Análisis de la Ley 20/2007, de 11 de julio, Laborum, 2007, 20.
Royal legislative decree No. 1/1995 of 24 March, through which is approved the
recast text of the law on the Statute of Workers, Official Gazette, No. 75, dated
29 March 1995, pp. 9654–9688.
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work.”32 As with other jurisdictions, the contractual label set by
the parties is not dispositive. Rather, a judicial assessment of the
substance of the relationship (e.g., day-by-day arrangements) is
most important.33
In 2007, the Spanish legislature34 enacted a new law (Law
20/2007, July 11, Estatuto del trabajo autónomo, LETA, i.e.
Statute for Self-Employed Workers).35 LETA regulated all forms
of self-employed or independent contractor-type of work and
covered all aspects of self-employment. LETA crafted a third
category of workers: “Trabajador Autonomo Economicamente
Dependiente” (or TRADE, i.e. economic dependent self-employed
worker). The TRADE were extended a fairly comprehensive
package of benefits and protections that are almost as good as
those given to employees.
However, it is difficult to become a TRADE worker. The
crucial component for determining whether a worker is a TRADE
rests on a 75% threshold of economic dependency. The TRADE
worker must “register” the position with the social administration
agency, notify them of any changes, with the principal then
verifying the information.
These strict requirements are
burdensome and time-consuming for both workers and
businesses.36
Perhaps because of the extensive disclosure and heavy
burden of compliance, few workers have actually become
classified as TRADE.37
Meanwhile, Spanish labor unions

32

See Miguel Ramón Alarcón Caracuel, Dipendenza e alienità nella discussione
spagnola sul contratto di lavoro, in Lavoro Subordinato E Dintorni.
Comparazioni E Prospettive 296 (1989); Consejo General del Poder Judicial,
Trabajadores autónomos, 146 estudio de derecho judicial 100 (2008); Perulli,
supra note 84.
33
STS 29 dic. 1999 (RJ 1427/2000).
34
See AA. VV. UN ESTATUTO PARA LA PROMOCIÓN Y TUTELA DEL
TRABAJADOR AUTÓNOMO, Informe de la Comisión de Expertos, designada por
el Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, para la elaboración de un Estatuto
del Trabajador Autónomo.
35
Law No. 20/2007, Official Gazette, No. 166, 12 July 2007, pp. 29964–29978.
36
Mark Freedland, Application of labour and employment law beyond the
contract of employment, 146 INT’L. LAB. REV. 3 (2007).
37
In 2012, only 9,000 TRADE contracts were signed, compared to the 400,000
forecasted. According to recent surveys by the Spanish organization “Unión de
Asociaciones de Trabajadores Autónomos y Emprendedores,” only 2.4% of the
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complained that the TRADE category was inappropriately
covering what should be traditional employment relationships.
With so few workers actually using this category, its usefulness is
limited.
Germany
Germany recognizes the categories of employees
(arbeitnehmer) and independent workers. Although until recently
there was no statutory definition of “employee,” the Federal Labor
Court has traditionally focused on the concepts of personal
dependence and the requirement that the worker must follow
instructions as to time, site, and content of services.38 The name
given in the contract is of little importance; rather, it is the
substance of the relationship that is important.
A German Federal Labour Court decision about circus
performers is instructive. In that case, the Court focused on the
lack of control that the owners had over the performances, finding
these workers to be more like independent workers.39 Independent
workers are defined in opposition to employees, with Section
84(1)(2) of the Commercial Code noting that independent workers
are “anybody who essentially is free in organizing his work and in
determining his working time.”40
German law also recognizes a third category of employeelike person (arbeitnehmeraehnliche Person). As noted by a leading
commentator, employee-like persons share two common
characteristics: “they are economically dependent and are in
similar need of social protection.”41 German labor courts had
recognized employee-like persons, and in 1974 the category was
codified in Section 12a of the German Collective Bargaining Act
(Tarifvertraggesetz). According to Section 12a, an employee-like
person must perform his or her duty to (i) the benefit of a client;
(ii) under service contract for a specific project; (iii) personally and
largely without collaboration of subordinate employees.
workforce have one principal and consequently “were covered by the fairly
extensive protections [for TRADE] afforded by the Law of 2007.”
38
See Wolfgang Daubler, Working People in Germany, 21 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 77, 79 (1999-2000).
39
Zirkus P GmbH & Co. KG v. Truppe C., Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG]
[Federal Labor Court], Aug. 11, 2015, 9 AZR 98/14.
40
MANFRED WEISS & M. SCHMIDT, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN GERMANY 45 (2008).
41
Daubler, supra note 39 at 88-90.
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Importantly, the provision also states that the employee-like person
works mainly for one client and relies on a single client for 50% of
his or her income, a threshold that has much in common with the
Spanish TRADE.42
While the definition of employee-like persons has some
variation among statutes, the main characteristic seems to be
economic dependence. Employee-like persons enjoy some of the
protections afforded to employees, including the right to unionize
and bargain collectively, parental leave, paid holidays, and safety
from harassment at work.
The aim of the third category of employee-like persons was
to enlarge the scope of social protections, given the organizational
and economic transformations around traditional employment
relationships. Will workers in the gig economy be protected as
employee-like persons on the basis of this third category? A recent
article by Professor Bernd Waas points out that the requirement of
working for one client for fifty percent of income could prove a
significant hurdle for establishing employee-like person status for
gig workers.43 But Professor Waas also invokes the possibility of
joint employer doctrine as a way to connect different companies
who hire the same worker to perform work on the same platform.
South Korea
In South Korea, the employee category is defined by
statute. Article 2(1) of the Korea Labor Standards Act uses the
following definition: “a person, regardless of the kind of
occupation, who offers labor to a business or workplace for the
purpose of earning wages.”44 Other sources that elaborate upon
this provision reveal that the concept of subordination is also
important to making a classification determination. A 2006
Korean Supreme Court decision interpreting the Korea Labor
Standards Act lists a series of factors to determine employee status.
These factors include whether the employer controls the content of
42

Stefanie Sorge, German Law on Dependent Self-Employed Workers: A
Comparison to the Current Situation Under Spanish Law, 31 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 249, 250 (2010).
43
Bernd Waas, Crowdwork in Germany, in BERND WAAS ET ALII, CROWDWORK
–
A
COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE, FRANKFURT 2017, PP. 142 – 186.
44
Korea Labor Standards Act, Art. 2, Sec. 1, available at http://elaw.klri.re.kr
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the work; whether the employee is subject to personnel
regulations; whether the employer supervises the work; whether
the employee is free to hire a subordinate to perform the work;
who provides work tools; how wages and income tax are
structured; and the economic situations of the parties,
respectively.45 Independent contractor status can conversely be
inferred for those who do not meet the statutory definition of
employees.
Interestingly for our purposes, South Korea has had a
longstanding percentage of the workforce that finds work in the
informal, precarious, and casual sector. Approximately one-third
of the workforce finds work in the category of irregular
employment (bijeonggyujik).46 According to older accounts, this
large percentage of irregular workers is a result of rural to urban
migration and consequent mismatches in the labor force with the
jobs on offer as well as worker displacement.47 A more recent
account points to the 1997 economic crisis and the IMF bailout, in
which some traditional labor protections were compromised in the
name of a flexible and competitive economy.48 As a result, more
workers found themselves working in irregular employment.
Within the bijeonggyujik, South Korean law recognizes a
category of workers known as “special type workers.” As noted by
Professor Deok Soon Hwang, special type workers are not a
universal category but instead a statutorily-created occupational
class for purposes of extending worker’s compensation coverage.49
Specifically, Article 125 of the Korean Industrial Accident
Compensation Act extends the protections of the worker’s
compensation laws to groups of workers in “special types of
employment,” so long as they provide labor service on a routine
45

Decision 2004-DA-29736, Korea Supreme Court (2006). Variations of this
language also appear in Jong-Hee Park, Employment Situations and Workers
Protections, Korea Labor Institute, Unpublished paper prepared for the ILO,
November 1999 , available at <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--ed_dialogue/---dialogue/documents/genericdocument/wcms_205370.pdf>.
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For discussion of the irregular sector, see Jennifer Jihye Chun, The Struggles
of Irregularly-Employed Workers in South Korea, 1992-2012 (unpublished
working paper for EOIW, 2014).
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Ji-Whan Yun, Unbalanced Development: The Origin of Korea’s SelfEmployment Problem from a Comparative Perspective, 47 J. OF DEVELOPMENT
STUD. 786 (2011).
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See Chun, supra note 47.
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Translation in possession of authors. This article was published in Korean by
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basis exclusively to a company and do not use subordinates. This
seems to be a way of distinguishing those workers who are
dependent and in need of protection from true entrepreneurial
enterprises.
The special types of employment are enumerated in the
statute and are quite specific: “insurance salesperson, visiting
teachers, ready mix truck driver, gold course caddies… door to
door deliverers, quick service driver… loan solicitor, credit card
solicitor, and exclusive chauffeur service worker[.]”50 This last
category of chauffeur was only added in July 2016. It is difficult
to justify precisely why these occupational categories, and not
others, are covered; the answer lies in the politics behind union
coverage in the wake of the Asian economic downturn in the late
1990s.
In 2016, the Korea Labor Institute, in connection with the
International Labour Office (ILO), organized a conference on
crowdwork and the gig economy. Special sessions were held to
discuss the status of gig workers in South Korea. While language
barriers and translation issues have stymied market growth by gig
economy companies within South Korea, the sector is continuing
to grow.
While some gig workers, such as those working as drivers
might be covered as special-type workers, participants noted that
other types of gig workers, such as those working to perform odd
jobs or those that work only in cyberspace would likely not be
covered. Furthermore, even for the enumerated categories of
special-type workers, the extent of coverage and protection is an
open question. As noted above, it is far from certain if special-type
workers enjoy the right to organize and the other protections
extended to employees. Commentators at the ILO conference
expressed concern and frustration about the precarious nature of
gig work and the perceived gaps in coverage for gig workers.
Summary and Assessment of Outcomes
The implementation of third categories in various nations
highlights both successes as well as problems. Canada’s passage
of legislation in the 1970s created a new category of “dependent
50

Id.
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contractors” through amending the definition of “employee” in
various statutes. The practical result of the “dependent contractor”
category was to expand the definition of employee and to bring
more workers under the ambit of labor law protection. The end
result was increased coverage and the provision of a safe harbor
for workers in need of protections, based on economic
dependency. The third category seems to have worked well in
terms of expanding the coverage of the laws to an increasing
number of workers.
From Italy’s experimentation with the third category, we
saw businesses trying to take advantage of a discounted status of
the parasubordinato to evade regulations applicable to employees,
such as social security contributions. The quasi-subordinate
category created a loophole that actually resulted in less protection
for workers. Through the years, the legislature attempted to adjust
the category in order to provide appropriate coverage for workers.
The ultimate result was confusion and since 2015, the intermediate
category has been extremely limited. Rather, workers are now
presumed by default to be employees.
Spain provided an example of a legal system that adopted a
third category, but only for a very few workers. The law assumes
that TRADE workers are predominantly working for one business;
this could be a problem for platform workers who are working for
multiple platforms. Looking at the causes of this very limited use
of the category, it comes down to a heavy burden of requirements
to be met, including the use of a strict economic threshold.
While Germany’s category of employee-like persons is far
less stringent and burdensome, the category still requires a 50
percent dependency threshold.
This threshold may prove
problematic for German crowdworkers unless they can mesh
several employers together through the joint employer doctrines
(i.e. accounts across different platforms would be pooled).
Finally, South Korea has a category for special-type
workers, but it is extremely narrow in scope, covering only certain
types of occupational categories. The exclusivity requirement in
the law may create trouble for gig workers who work for more than
one platform. Further, the benefits extended to those who fall into
the special-type workers category are meager. If the third type of
category is too narrow, or the benefits provided too meager, the
category may prove inadequate for the challenges of the on-
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demand economy.
Analysis
Note that the debate over misclassification actually can be
interpreted two different ways. One way to view the issue is to
acknowledge that there has been legitimate confusion about forms
of gig work that do not fit easily into binary distinctions. After all,
gig-workers have some characteristics that are common to
independent contractors and yet others that are reminiscent of
employees. The problem, under this view, lies with a legal test
that is malleable, fact-intensive, and difficult to apply. The other
way to consider the misclassification issue is to acknowledge that
there has long been arbitrage of the law – illegitimate practices that
lead to misclassification of what truly are employment
relationships.
These practices serve to hide employment
relationships under the guise of “false” or “bogus” contractor
situations. Note that both of these problems may exist within the
same legal system.
At least in theory, establishing an intermediate category for
gig work might alleviate legitimate confusion about how to apply
to the test to gig workers. However, if the consequences of
establishing such a third category would be arbitrage and
downgrading of employees to intermediate status, that would do
nothing to eliminate bogus contractor status. In fact, adding a new
category could increase the possibility for arbitrage. We must
acknowledge that three categories create more room for mischief
than two, and we can see from the Italian case that such arbitrage
there became widespread in response to the adoption of the quasisubordinate worker category.
Difficulties with Implementing a Third Category in the United
States
If we examine the list of benefits and protections that go
along with employee status, it becomes difficult to start excluding
these from the third category. What protections are completely
unnecessary? One of the primary complaints of many gig workers
in inadequate pay for their time, so Harris & Kreuger’s suggestion
that wage and hour laws could be excluded seems problematic.
Apart from difficulties defining the category or how it would be
constituted, there are also practical difficulties. In the United
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States, establishing a third category over a patchwork of state and
federal regulation would be complex.
While it is possible that judges and administrative bodies
could shift their interpretation of the statutes so as to create a third
category, it is unlikely given the way that the statutes are written.
Given the current political climate it seems doubtful that a third
category would be high on the legislative agenda in the United
States right now. Looking beyond Congress, adding a third
classification when the statutes only call for two categories would
call for a vast feat of administrative or judicial activism. At least at
this moment, reform in this direction seems unlikely from a
practical perspective.
Shifting Towards a Default Presumption of Employee Status
Rather than create a new category, one way to govern the
difficult classification issues is to change the default rules. Instead
of having the platform choose to classify workers as independent
contractors in its terms of service online and then later defend its
position in lengthy, expensive, and time-consuming litigation, what
if we began with a presumption that, above a certain threshold of
hours, workers are employees? Then those who truly are
independent businesses or self-employed would opt-out of
regulations based on a set of easily understood standards.
But what about the idea that the gig economy is innovative?
Should platforms be given special treatment because they use new
technology? Innovation has not typically been a basis for an
exemption from the labor laws. The problem is distinguishing
between authentic innovators, who could compete on a level
playing field or who have a distinct and interesting new technology
or business model, and those platforms that are profiteers who
exist only to take advantage of cheap labor by undercutting the
law. Hence our argument is that platforms should be normalized
and treated like other employers, rather than fight over their
supposed exceptionalism.
Business models that either are truly “sharing,” some mix of
profit and non-profit (for example, “B” corporations),51 or those
that engage in prosumer transactions, genuinely might need room
to experiment. There should be a “safe harbor” created if the work
51
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looks more like volunteerism, sharing, or the work is being
undertaken for altruistic reasons or community-minded
motivations. More recently, the European Commission has
supported this view in its Communication on the “collaborative
economy,” distinguishing between professional providers and
private individuals.52
There are also some instances where the provision of a
service is de minimis (or provided so infrequently) that it does not
merit employee status. For example, if someone logs into a
crowdwork platform and does some proofreading for an hour a
month, that user is probably not an employee. Likewise, those
who participate in Lyft as a carpool on their way to work three
days a week are probably not employees. We do not wish to
impose burdensome legalities on users for one-off situations.
Likewise, we would not want to discourage neighbors or
volunteers from providing their services to others when those
efforts are truly voluntary or used only to defray legitimate
expenses, such as those who carpool from city to city in Europe
through BlaBlaCar. Rather, we are more concerned with platforms
that seem to be competing with, or in some instances replacing,
full-time employment with on-demand precarious work.53
Conclusion
Calls for a third category in the United States reflexively
52
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appear to be an easy solution, tailor-made for the problems
surfacing in the gig economy. That initial reaction, however, is
tempered upon further study of the content and history of the
implementation of the third category in other nations. In this book
chapter we examined the experiences of other nations in the hopes
of learning winning strategies and avoiding problems.
In Italy, the adoption of the third category led to
widespread arbitrage of the categories, with businesses moving
employees into a “bogus” discounted status in the quasisubordinate category. In Spain, the requirements for attaining the
third category were burdensome enough that the third category
only is applicable to a tiny number of workers. Viewed in this
light, experimenting with a third category might be seen as more
risky than just the “easy” or “obvious” solution as it first appears.
Rather than risking arbitrage of the categories, and the
possibility that some workers will actually end up losing rights, it
makes sense to think about employment status as the default rule
for most gig workers, except those that may fit into a safe harbor
because they are either not working very much (true “amateurs”)
or are engaged in volunteerism for altruistic reasons (truly
“sharing”). If there is to be an intermediate category, establishing
one that, like Canada’s “dependent contractor,” expands the scope
of the employment relationship would best meet the needs of gig
workers. Such a default rule or expanded definition makes sense
whether we are thinking about gig workers, those in fissured
workplaces, franchises, or other non-standard or contingent work
arrangements.

